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Water, Climate, and Economy in India from 1880
to the Present This article explores the interaction between
water, environmental change, and economic change in India since the
end of the nineteenth century. A struggle to mitigate poverty and
inequality in access to water, a condition that the tropical-monsoon
climate made almost universal, delivered economic growth and de-
mographic transition in colonial India (1858–1947) and postcolonial
India. At the same time, ensuring the fair distribution of a vital resource
like water led to its overexploitation. The “tragedy of the commons”
notion that Hardin advanced is not an accurate representation of this
syndrome (see below).1
In the tropics, extreme heat dries up surface water quickly,
making mobilization of water for cultivation, industrial use, and con-
sumption costly. The heat and the oceans also produce a powerful
hydrologic cycle, which makes agriculture possible but raises the risk
of famines and floods. Economic shocks in South Asia were—and still
are, to no small extent—environmental in origin. The climate caused
drought if the monsoon was too weak and caused storm surges and
floods if the monsoon was too strong. In the late nineteenth century,
a succession of bad monsoons raised prices, reduced consumption,
raised debts, and brought down banks. In the worst cases, famines
and epidemics erupted among people weakened by malnutrition.
In 1876, 1896, and 1899, famines ravaged peninsular India, killing
millions. Droughts returned roughly once in seven years, always
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reducing consumption and sometimes causing severe stress to public
finance, the balance of payments, and vulnerable communities.
The great famines of the nineteenth century began a deep-
seated process of change. Famines disappeared in the region after
1900, even though severeweather shocks persisted, droughts became
less destructive, and food production increased dramatically. After
the great influenza epidemic of 1918, the population growth rate,
which remained at a near-zero average for forty years, started rising
steadily. What kind of intervention had eased the environmental
constraints on economic progress? The common feature was in-
creased water security, that is, greater per capita access to water
and the availability of more potable water for communities that
had earlier suffered deprivation. Although public works were an
essential factor behind the change, the state was a limited agent.
Popular politics, market forces, law, and the knowledge gained in
famine operations played significant roles. Greater security enabled
reclamation of marginal lands, intensive agriculture, urbanization,
and disease control.
Gaining security at a timewhen renewable water was extremely
scarce, and river morphology extremely unstable, could not have
come without negative consequences. Colonial India heavily
depended on the state-led technological solution of impounding
excess flow in rivers via dams and reservoirs. In the twentieth cen-
tury, the model came under so much criticism for its environmental
and political costs that it was effectively abandoned. As it became
unpopular, users switched to groundwater, which changed the nature
of the problem from insecurity to depletion.
“India is in the grip of acute water scarcity,” wrote a BBC news
report in 2019. Academic work on the crisis and possible solutions
to it tend to focus on the present.Most scientists and economists today
would see ecological stress as an example of unrestricted greed leading
to the degradation of the commons.Understanding the economic his-
tory of this crisis permits a more informed perspective on the problem.
Given that a set of human actions has mitigated the climatic constraint
on demographic and economic change since 1880, the questions are
what exactly were these actions, why did they appear in the late nine-
teenth century, and what were their costs? The famine-relief policy
instituted at that time defined the “water famine” as a seasonal condi-
tion, introducing the concept of the public trust in water. The story
of India’s problem with water security and access involves myriad
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political movements addressing socially sanctioned forms of depriva-
tion, various forms of public intervention, and ongoing water stress.
THE TROPICAL-MONSOON CLIMATE AND THE WATER PROBLEM A useful
reference point is the köppen-geiger map of the world, which, using
two dimensions—temperature and seasonality of precipitation—
describes much of South Asia (along with coastal West Africa and a
part of Southeast Asia) as areas of “tropical monsoon.”Tropical mon-
soon is a combination of above-average temperature and seasonal
concentration of rainfall. Figure 1a/b illustrates the South Asian situ-
ation, comparing three climatic profiles, “temperate,” “temperate
monsoon,” and “tropicalmonsoon.”The two temperate-zone places
are London and Tokyo. Delhi is the tropical-monsoon city. In an
average year, the maximum temperature in Delhi is about twice as
high as that in London for every month of the year, exceeding 36 de-
grees celsius from mid-April to the end of June. In an average year,
rainfall inDelhi, which depends on themonsoonwinds, is confined to
three months; the rest of the year is drier relative to the temperate
zone. The monthly average rainfall in London varies from approxi-
mately 40 to 70mm.Themonthly average rainfall inDelhi varies from
10 to 250 mm. In Delhi, 75 percent of the rains occur during the third
quarter of the year; in London, quarterly rainfall ranges between 21
and 31 percent. The seasonal concentration of moisture is a monsoon
characteristic, but not all monsoons are alike. Delhi and Tokyo both
have monsoons; Delhi experiences aridity, whereas Tokyo does not.2
Fig. 1 Climate Data for Delhi, London, and Tokyo (Recent Years)
2 For the köppen-geigermap, see http://koeppen-geiger.vu-wien.ac.at/present.htm (accessed
May 21, 2020); for the WATCH (Water and Global Change) data sets, http://www
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What is aridity? The heat in the tropical region dries up surface
water. The average evaporation rate is a function of (among other
variables) available surface water and the heat of the sun. During
summer in the Himalayas or the Arctic, the rate reaches extremely
high levels. In the deserts, the rate is extremely low throughout the
year. Any region with a high rate in one season and a low one in
another would have plenty of surface water in somemonths and lose
it in certain other months. In most parts of India, the rate reaches 60
to 100 mm per month from June to September when the monsoon
rain occurs in combination with high heat. As surface water dries up,
the rate falls extremely quickly. The rate of evaporation (0 to 20mm)
that prevails from April to June in nearly all of India except the
Bengal delta and the southernmost regions of the peninsular, like
Kerala, tends toward the range that characterizes the great deserts
of the northern hemisphere.3
Seasonality, Agriculture, and Poverty The tropical monsoon has
always constrained economic growth. Because of the quick evapo-
ration of surface water, agriculture and survival required procuring
water over long distances, mining it from below ground, or relying
on the seasonally variable common sources. The first two options
were ordinarily expensive, and all three were uncertain; excessive
heat reduced the infiltration and seepage that sustained non-surface
sources. Furthermore, seasonality shortened the working year. The
one short season of economic activity in the tropical-monsoon re-
gion typically did not occur in the rainier months but early in the
winter, when the rain-fed crops came into the market—the busy
season when wages and interest rates were at their peak. In the slack
season, with surplus labor and idle capital, wages and interest rates
plummeted. All agricultural societies experience seasonality. The
tropical-monsoon regions experienced extreme degrees of it.4
.waterandclimatechange.eu/evaporation/average-monthly-1985-1999 (accessed October 19,
2019). Even though elements of the tropical-monsoon conditions exist in other geographies,
not all tropical regions and all monsoon regions are similar. South Asia and northeast Asia are
not comparable; nor are the countries of South Asia with those in the African Sahel. The Sahel
has a monsoon like India’s, but it is weaker. The Sahel’s mean annual rainfall is 100 to 300 mm;
India’s is 300 to 650mm.Both areas face a high seasonal cost of accessingwater, but SouthAsia has
greater ground- and surface-water resources.
3 Evaporation is caused not only by the heat of the sun but also by the transpiration from
plants. However, the evaporation data cited herein do not account for transpiration.
4 For an economic-historical treatment of seasonality, see Roy, “Monsoon and the Market
for Money in Late Colonial India,” Enterprise and Society, XVII (2016), 324–357.
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In the past, seasonality caused poverty by making intensive
agriculture expensive and enforcing unemployment for months. In
the absence of artificial irrigation, the monsoon rains made sowing
relatively easy in most parts of India. The usual practice in the nine-
teenth century was to have two plantings in the monsoon, of which
one was a major grain. In some regions, a weak winter monsoon
enabled a second and minor crop. The ability to grow any of the
major grains inwinter, or someof the profitable year-round crops like
sugar cane, depended on irrigation that required either impounding
rain and river flows or digging for water underground. Private capital
was generally insufficient to achieve both forms of recycling, espe-
cially in southern India where the crust was made of hard rock.
Recent national-income estimates for periods before 1850 confirm
that India was a considerably poorer place thanWestern Europe before
the Industrial Revolution began. These studies do not explain why
India was impoverished for centuries. A plausible explanation is the
low agricultural yield and under-employment of resources attributable
to the environment. Moreover, the risk to life was considerable in this
climate. In the nineteenth century, whenever two successivemonsoons
failed or the southwest monsoon and the northeast monsoon failed in
the same year, famines were the inevitable outcome.5
What mitigating actions could those living in the countryside
take to reduce poverty and the likelihood of famine?Migration with
transhumance was one option, but that strategy carried costs. For
most of the agricultural population, whose only asset was a plot of
land fixed in space, other mitigation strategies were necessary. The
most secure form was to create access to controllable and reliable
sources of water that would be available throughout the year and
enable intensive and profitable cultivation—a deep well on a large
aquifer, for example, as opposed to seasonally variable sources like
streams and ponds. In 1850s India, such fixed pools were usually
privately or communally owned. The best supply sources were pri-
vately ownedmasonry wells. As the Imperial Gazetteer of 1909 noted,
“The main opening for individual enterprise lies in the construction
of wells.” In southern India, artificial lakes and tanks provided a
measure of security, but tanks were expensive to build and maintain,
5 Stephen Broadberry, Johann Custodis, and Bishnupriya Gupta, “India and the Great
Divergence: An Anglo-Indian Comparison of GDP per capita, 1600–1871,” Explorations
in Economic History, LV (2015), 58–75.
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tended not to support equal access, and sustained reduced capacity
after successive dry seasons.6
The New Access to Water The significant improvement in access
to water in India from 1885 onward has led to a massive change in
population and food production. During the last 130 years, per capita
water use has increased three times (Table 1), population six times, and
total water use more than twenty times. Food-grain production in-
creased from 15 to 20 million tons in 1885 to 50 million in 1950 and
more than 250 million in 2015.
The technology ofwater extraction, state intervention, and laws
of access all changed after India gained independence from British
rule in 1947. Nonetheless, the trajectory of rising use was colonial
in origin. This achievement came at a cost, however, as expected
for a region with limited renewable water stock. Usable stock as a
proportion of renewable source fell (Table 2). The World Bank
6 Imperial Gazetteer of India (London, 1909), III, 92. A tank in South India is a human-made
reservoir, sometimes embanked.





















1885 43 6 50 260 192
1938 125 9 134 380 352
1968 309 15 324 535 606
1988 460 40 500 830 602
2015 876 124 1,000 1,310 763
NOTES The sources make a distinction between irrigation or agricultural use, and “domestic
and industrial” or “consumption and industrial” use, which is, in theory, water for drinking in
both rural and urban areas and water for industrial use. The first year for which reliable esti-
mates for these two classes of use are available was 1968. Two assumptions allow us to stretch
the estimate backward—that agricultural use rose at the same rate as the quantity of irrigated
land and that the 1968 average “consumption and industrial” use had remained unchanged
since 1885. Realistically, because the irrigation canals also delivered more drinking water, the
earlier figures for consumption underestimate the increase.
SOURCES G. N. Kathpalia and N. S. Varadan, “Need for a National Water Policy,” Sympo-
sium on Integrated Development of Surface and Sub-surface Water Resources (New Delhi, 1971), I,
49–66; Asian development Research Institute, “India’s Water Facts,” available at https://
www.adriindia.org/adri/india_water_facts (accessed April 25, 2020); http://www
.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html (accessed April 25, 2020).
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measures water stress as the withdrawal of fresh water as a percentage
of renewable supply. In 2016, levels of stress ranged from 42 percent
in India to 105 percent in Pakistan; the levels were considerably
lower in the United Kingdom (10), the United States (22), Japan
(28), and China (30). The close across-country correlation between
average temperature, latitude, and stress, suggests that the stress
pattern is mainly climatic and geological in origin. Given that much
renewable water remains still untapped, this situation may not seem
tragic. But themarginal cost of using the resource is high and rising in
South Asia.7
How do we know that it is high? First, not all the available
water should be exploited; the proportion of use to exploitable
resource has fallen at a progressively steeper rate in the late twen-
tieth century. Second, the proportion of groundwater extraction
seems to have increased (the data are not complete), and ground-
water extraction is usually more expensive than the use of surface
water. Already, the extraction of renewable sources generates
higher costs (deeper bore wells) and poorer quality (brackish water
and contaminated aquifers) than in the past. Third, hydro-politics
has grown more contentious as these changes accrued. Hence, the
history that this article traces in Figure 2 looks like a cross (Figure 2).
Access increased in the long run, though stress also increased,
because geography limited the “degrees of freedom” to sustain









1968 2,778 2,577 12,618 3,744 (1973) 70
1988 1,764 2,591 10,946 3,431 54
2015 1,116 2,191 8,685 3,373 8
NOTES Exploitable resource = total renewable resource (surface water + groundwater – overlap)
– environmental flow requirement for sustainability of the aquatic system. The figure for India is
1,089 BCM during the year (2015), held constant for all times. Usable resource is (1 – use/resource).
SOURCE http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html (accessed April 25,
2020).
7 For the World Bank, see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.FWST.ZS (ac-
cessed October 19, 2019); World Resources Institute, https://www.wri.org/resources/charts-
graphs/water stress-country (accessed October 15, 2019).
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continually increasing per capita entitlement. Most societies in the
last century are probably amenable to such a cross, but the steep
slope of the stress curve in India is unusual and worrying.
Previous Studies of India’s Environmental History Is the argu-
ment of this article truly new? In specific contexts, environmental
historians and economic historians of India have made a connection
between the environment and the economy. Yet, to this point in
time, no body of writings has asked the question that this article an-
swers: How did human environmental intervention create condi-
tions for economic growth and population transition? Until now,
no historical scholarship, either on the economy or on the ecology
in India, has taken note of what this article terms “the water cross.”
Global environmental history has, by and large, overlooked
the tropical-monsoon condition in relation to economic change.
The Oxford Handbook of Environmental History does not mention the
word monsoon. Davis and Egan’s The Arid Lands admirably questions
many Europeanist preconceptions about tropical lands but does
not engage with the combination of aridity and monsoon that
produces seasonality in South Asia. Amrith’s Unruly Waters con-
nects the control of rivers with secure livelihoods in South Asia,
but, unlike this article, it does not seek to explain the modern eco-
nomic history of the region. The substantial Indianist scholarship
about environmental history, part of it covering water, is rich and
insightful about imperialism, but it scarcely engages in an economic
Fig. 2 The Water Cross
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history that can explain changes in India’s production conditions and
demographic transition.8
Development economics in the early postwar years was interested
in natural-resource endowments but rarely discussed water. In the
1980s, an offshoot of this field coined the phrase monsoon Asia, to
show why some monsoon regions facing seasonal unemployment
needed to prioritize labor-absorbing activities. Because this Japano-
centric concept of monsoon Asia did not deal with aridity, it did not
apply well to the tropical monsoon areas (see Figure 1). By underes-
timating aridity, the concept of monsoon Asia imposed an artificial
uniformity over a diverse geographical area.9
The literature about sustainability is also of limited relevance. The
formative contributions to the field—from Hardin and Ostrom—
turned the attention of scholars to the common-property-resource
problem. The tragedy of the commons as generally understood in
ecology and economic theory occurs when the heavy exploitation
of a common resource leads to an adverse outcome. The implication
is that some old rules of exploitation that could provide good results—
what Hardin called “social arrangements that produce responsibility”—
fell by the wayside, requiring new cooperative rules to be designed.
The “tragedy” perspective spawned important works on water. The
resource problem discussed in this article, however, is not necessarily
an overuse problem but a complex condition involving a scarcity
of renewable sources, seasonal famine, and social inequality. The
8 Andrew C. Isenberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Environmental History (New York,
2017). Several essays in Paul G. Harris and Graeme Lang (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Envi-
ronment and Society in Asia (New York, 2014), recognize water access, water stress, seasonality,
and their institutional challenges but do not offer a coherent model of economic history. Con-
stance Lever-Tracy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Climate Change and Society (New York, 2010), is
less informative about monsoon seasonality and is similarly preoccupied with the present. Sam
White, Christian Pfister, and Franz Mauelshagen (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Climate History
(New York, 2018) has excellent chapters about South Asia but barely addresses the impact of
climate on water and society. See also Diana K. Davis and Michael Egan, The Arid Lands: His-
tory, Power, Knowledge (Cambridge Mass., 2016); Sunil Amrith, Unruly Waters: How Mountain
Rivers and Monsoons Have Shaped South Asia’s History (New York, 2018). For surveys, see Mahesh
Rangarajan, “Environment and Ecology Under British Rule,” in Douglas Peers and Nandini
Gooptu (eds.), India and the British Empire (New York, 2012), 212–230; “Introduction,” in
Richard Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and Satpal Sangwan (eds.), Nature and the Orient (New
York, 2000), 1–26. David Gilmartin, “Water and Waste: Nature, Productivity and Colonialism
in the Indus Basin,” Economic and Political Weekly, 38 (2003), 5057–5065; Rohan D’Souza,
“Water in British India: The Making of a ‘Colonial Hydrology,’” History Compass, IV (2006),
621–628.
9 Harry T. Oshima, Economic Growth in Monsoon Asia: A Comparative Study (Tokyo, 1987).
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commons came under pressure because of a successful response to
poverty, risk, and inequality—hardly a tragedy.10
WATER AND FAMINE IN THE DECCAN In the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, the Deccan—the plateau that forms the central part of
the peninsular region in South Asia—underwent three famines. The
epicenter of the first one (1876/7) was in the southern districts, then
called Madras-Deccan and now the southwestern region of Andhra
Pradesh in India. The other two, 1896/7 and 1898/9, occurred on the
northwestern side of the plateau, the area then known as Bombay-
Deccan. Though hardly the only famines to have occurred in this
region, these famines are distinguished by the large volume of documen-
tation that they elicited in the attempt to generate a theory of dry land
famines. The theory that eventually emerged was that famines were a
feature of the tropical-monsoon climate and that preventive actions
could include canal irrigation to increase food production and rail trans-
port to enable cheaper and faster distribution of food when the mon-
soon failed. What followed this action plan is something of a puzzle.
The years of the Deccan famines saw unusual climatic condi-
tions caused by the El Niño Southern Oscillation phenomenon.
Even though famines disappeared from the Deccan after 1900,
weather shocks of similar severity repeated after 1900 in at least four
years. “Yet the potential dangers were largely dealt with.”What had
happened to make this transformation possible? Economic histo-
rians suggest that some aspects of the famine mitigation policy—
especially the development of the railways as food carriers—helped
to contain the demographic effects of the droughts. But this account
is incomplete because it ignores water. As shown below, the docu-
mentation made a distinction between a famine of food and one of
water. Railways could potentially solve the famine of food. In the case
of water, irrigation became something of a preventive measure, but
only in the less-deprived deltas and the Indo-Gangetic Basin, not so
much in the Deccan, though famines did disappear there after 1900.11
10 The cited text is from Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,”1243–1248.
11 Tim Dyson, Population History of India (New York, 2018), 158; Michelle B. McAlpin,
Subject to Famine: Food Crisis and Economic Change in Western India, 1860–1920 (Princeton,
1983); Robin Burgess and Dave Donaldson, “Can Openness Mitigate the Effects of Weather
Shocks? Evidence from India’s Famine Era,” American Economic Review, C (2010), 449–453;
Martin Ravallion, “Trade and Stabilisation: Another Look at British India’s Controversial
Foodgrain Exports,” Explorations in Economic History, XXIV (1987), 354–370.
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In fact, famine documents revealed a growing awareness that,
given the geography, the solution to the Deccan’s problem demanded
a differentmodel from the official riparian policy. It required reliance on
subsoil water, access to which was restricted by law, and by caste status.
Water security in this region required a well, ordinarily an expensive
asset. The famine relief led to the construction, and occasionally the
sequestration, of wells. How extensive these actions were and the leg-
acies that they produced will need more research. Famine historiog-
raphy has overlooked, or at least underestimated, this aspect of the
relief process. The water-specific actions likely contributed to the dis-
appearance of famines; at the very least, they introduced the concept of
the public trust in underground resources, a radical idea for the time.12
What made water such an issue in the Deccan? A full answer to
the question combines climate with geology. The larger part of the
plateau in its northwestern side, the so-called Traps, was formed of late
Mesozoic volcanic eruptions 60 to 65 million years ago. The southern
and eastern side of the Deccan uplands formed parts of the Gondwana
continent that drifted away fromAfrica and collidedwith the Eurasian
plate about 40 to 55 million years ago, creating the Himalayan
mountains. Because of their different geological origins, the soil and
rock types vary between these zones. Both regions, however, have
hard-rock formations. The pattern of precipitation also imparts a
uniformity to both regions. The rain-bearing clouds of the southwest
monsoon lose a lot of their moisture when crossing theWestern Ghat
mountains. The hotter air of the plateau creates a convectional process
that causes storms and cools the air, but seasonal rainfall is less than
one-third that on the windward side of the mountains.
Although the Deccan received smaller quantities of annual
monsoon rainfall than did eastern or coastal India, it was not the
driest part of India. Furthermore, since the mountain range has
few gaps along its north–south expanse for nearly 1,000 miles, much
of the rainwater flows down the eastern slope into the plateau and
forms the so-called Ghat-fed rivers. Godavari and Krishna, and
the two tributaries of the Krishna, Bhima, and Tungabhadra
Rivers, carry most of this flow. Between them, the Godavari and
Krishna drainage area covers more than two-thirds of the plateau.
12 The Famine Commission of 1898 described the scale of construction of wells, which was
large, but the enterprise suffered from a high incidence of failed construction. India, Report of
the Indian Famine Commission 1898 (Simla, 1898), 185–186.
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Nonetheless, “the Deccan rivers cannot be depended upon as a
perennial source of supply.” Whereas in northern India, the rivers
receive snowmelt, theDeccan rivers do not. Therefore, the flow level
varies enormously between seasons.On anOctober day in 1903,more
than 1 million cubic feet flowed per second near Vijayawada town,
which is about 70 miles inland from the mouth of the Krishna River.
In the summer months at the turn of the nineteenth century, the level
reduced to 100 cusecs. During the dry season of 1899, the mighty
Krishna and Godavari were “reduced to a series of shallow pools.”
For eight months in a year, the rivers did not carry much water to
sustain either intensive agriculture or a large population.13
Tanks and Wells Other than in the deltas, cultivation and sur-
vival were dependent on tanks and wells instead of the rivers. Wells
were not easy to build. The aquifers in the Deccan trap occur in
fissures between layers of hard rock. Some of these fissures formed
from successive volcanic eruptions. In the alluvial Gangetic Basin,
subsoil water can be found nearly everywhere. In the Deccan trap,
the presence of subsoil water depends on the position of a fissure.
Having to dig through basaltic rock made well construction expen-
sive and risky: “[T]here [was] by no means a certainty of meeting
water. The Deccan . . . is full of wells which have been dug and been
failures . . . . [T]he percentage of failures among wells [cannot] be less
than forty per cent.” Besides, successive dry seasons could reduce
water in tanks and wells to dangerously low levels. Hence, subsoil
water was crucial to meet seasonal shortages in the region.14
The value of the wells had become common knowledge in
famine operations since the 1876–1878 episode. Yet, the civil admin-
istration in most provinces did not collect or record data about the
quantity and depth of subsoil water. The only data set available came
from the logbooks of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway that reg-
istered levels in thewells fromwhich the locomotives drewwater. At
the onset of the 1898 famine, the local officers who studied these data
concluded that a period of relative dryness had caused almost “total
disappearance of a huge volume of subterranean water all over the
Deccan, on which it was formerly possible to draw in a year of
drought.” Soon, more specific reports were available from other
13 The Economic Life of Hyderabad (Hyderabad, 1937), 117; Report on the Famine of the Bombay
Presidency (Bombay, 1903), 8.
14 Harold H. Mann, Well Waters from the Trap Area of Western India (Poona, 1915), 3.
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regions, with the samemessage: “[T]he level of the sub-soil water has
never been so low within living memory . . . [in all] districts of the
Deccan andKarnatak.” In Sholapur district, tanks still had somewater
in them, but the little that remained was preserved for drinking, not
for cultivation. “In many places, do what one may, no water is to be
got.” The same story repeated in many small towns in the Bombay-
Deccan and the army bases. “The rain we have just had has been all
absorbed by the parched surface soil and has not replenished the
spring.”15
Local officials understood that subsoil water was the crucial
warning sign, though the administration did not back up their hunch
with a monitoring system. Between 1876 and 1899, the administra-
tive correspondence created the phrase “water famine,” which
filtered into the growing media discourse about famines in western
India. Importing food from outside the region could technically
end a famine of food, but awater famine had no solution. “The short-
age of drinking water is one of the most grievous effects of a drought,
that is naturally more dreaded than a failure of food crops and is also
more difficult to be combated than the scarcity of grain.”16
State relief was often too little and too late, though it introduced
twonew tactics regarding groundwater—the requisition of privatewells
and steps to improve the quality of well water. Private rights were an
obstacle to famine response not only because the law protected them
but also because they were biased by caste. The governor of Bombay
observed that the “humble castes” had suffered the most from the
calamity in 1876–1878. During the 1899 famine, again, local officials
found that “as to the ‘caste’ of those died, by far the great majority are
‘Hindus of low caste.’” Faminemortality derived largely fromunequal
rights of access to the best wells.Members of the depressed castes relied
15 Papers Regarding the Famine and the Relief Operations in India during 1900–1902 (London,
1902), 263, 176.
16 Water security entered the discourse of famine response in western India before 1876, but
only randomly. Water eventually occupied a central place in the framework of relief that
emerged in the last quarter of the century. For a discussion of the water initiatives in early
nineteenth-century famines, see George Adamson, “‘The Most Horrible of Evils’: Social Re-
sponses to Drought and Famine in the Bombay Presidency, 1782–1857,” in Greg Bankoff and
Joseph Christensen (eds.), Natural Hazards and Peoples in the Indian Ocean World (Basingstoke,
2016), 79-104. The 1899 famine “was a famine of water as well as of food,” according to the
Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901 (Calcutta, 1901), 61. Anon., “The Famine in
India: Nasik District,” Times of India, 20 Feb. 1900; Report of Famine Operations in the Baroda
State 1911–12 (Bombay, 1913), 22.
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on the commons, exposing themselves and their animals to disease,
whereas the secure sources were guarded closely by the village elite.
By the 1899 famine, this pattern was so well-known that the Bombay
Famine Code had instructed the medical officers on duty “to watch
the state of the water-supply, especially that allotted to the low-caste
people.”17
In an uncoordinated way, the relief effort involved creating an
increase in the only form of asset that could potentially mitigate a
drought. The relief-camp operation usually started with a search
for a secure water source or the digging of a well. In regions with less
of a water problem, the camps gave work and food only to workers
who brought their water for the day. That option did not exist in the
Deccan. On a few occasions, the camps also requisitioned private
wells, overriding legally secure private rights. Although the British
Indian statewas ordinarily reluctant to revoke caste privileges, during
the 1899 famine, the relief authorities often did so. They dug a great
many wells with relief money to ensure that whenever possible,
“low caste people were . . . given separate wells.” In 1896/7, famine
relief included a policy “to deepen wells when necessary and advis-
able; and . . . to sink new wells in districts where they may be neces-
sary, to prevent migration of cattle and people.”18
Water, Disease, and Sanitation Work onwells acquired another
important motivation when the safety of water, rather than the mere
quantity of it, became a concern between 1876 and 1900. In 1876,
food and the railways were considered to be sufficient for an effective
famine policy. By 1900, the accent in the official reports had shifted
to disease after cholera was found to have taken more lives than
17 The governor of Bombay, cited in Sivaram H. Chiplonkar (ed.), Quarterly Journal of the
Poona Sarvajanik Society (Poona, 1878), 7. Papers Regarding the Famine and the Relief Operations in
India, 238. Referring to a 1951 epidemiological study of cholera in Madras Presidency, David
Arnold wrote, “Even in non-famine times, social discrimination against low-caste and Un-
touchable labourers often obliged them to drink from readily contaminated water sources”
(“Cholera and Colonialism in British India,” Past & Present, 113 [1986], 1 126). Famine Relief
Code: Bombay Presidency (Poona, 1927), 59.
18 Appendix to the Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1898, being Minutes of Evidence, etc.
(London, 1898), I (Bengal), 112; Report on the Famine in the Bombay Presidency: “Orders were
also issued granting certain concessions to owners of private wells who allowed the public to
draw water for domestic consumption, and wherever people of low caste were to be supplied
from these wells, Government undertook the expenditure of providing special water carriers”
(42); Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, 62; Report of the Famine in the Bombay Pres-
idency in 1896–1897 (Bombay, 1898), xcix; Papers Regarding the Famine and the Relief Operations
in India, 262.
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starvation, making not only secure but also safe water a private good
(Table 3). Sanitary engineers appeared in themajor provinces around
1860, though not much money or power attached to the position.
During the 1876 famine, the Sanitary Department’s work “[fell] far
short” of needs. The provincial governments had too few funds to
shore up their work. Moreover, “the risk of interfering with preju-
dice . . . frequently [stood] in theway of improvement.”Nonetheless,
the famine of 1876 defined the role of this office more sharply than
ever before. In 1896 and again in 1899, the Bombay Sanitary Depart-
ment officers were disinfecting wells on an unprecedented scale.
The reports stated that the mortality in the dry land famine was
attributable to caste prejudice because access to secure water favored
the higher castes.Within a few years after the last of the great dry land
famines, a movement formed to challenge these traditional biases.19
RELIGION, CASTE, AND EQUAL RIGHTS TO WATER Contemporary
commentators on the movement for secure, clean water treated
these biases as the legacy of an ancient set of entitlements. Anthro-
pological history sometimes involves the claim that some features of
the caste system were reframed during colonial times. Be that as it
may, the question still arises, What, if anything, did colonial India
inherit from the distant past?20
In 1936, Ambedkar, the leading spokesperson for the depressed
castes, maintained that the “annihilation of caste” would be difficult
to achieve without radical methods, because caste and sacredness
were interdependent concepts. The link between them implied a
norm that sharing water with others caused pollution and loss of
19 Arnold, “Cholera and Colonialism,” discusses the “synchronization” of famine and chol-
era in the late nineteenth century; Report of the Indian Famine Commission. Part I. Famine Relief
(London, 1880), 108.
20 Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton,
2001).
Table 3 Occurrence of Words Every 100 Pages in Three Famine Commission
Reports
1880 1898 1901
Irrigation 126 69 18
Railway 23 19 3
Cholera 2 8 18
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caste. Interpretations of scripture and activist writings about caste as a
lived experience suggest that this moral rulewas an inheritance rather
than a colonial invention. Summing up a millennium of injunctions
about caste, Kane said, “In most of the works on the castes in India a
few features are pointed out as the characteristics of the caste system.”
One of them concerns who could (or could not) take water from
whom.The underlying ideawas that waterwas not a shareable good,
and rights depended on caste. Classical Hindu writings on statecraft
and social conduct are explicit that such rights entail segregation
according to ritual status.21
Dumont’s later proposal that India was a civilization based on
“a single true principle, namely the opposition of the pure and the
impure,” confirmed what the classical scholars had said about the
origin of the rights. The nature of that right was not proprietary in
the modern sense but moral, with a two-sided claim. The Brahmin
had a right to use a village well, and the untouchable had a religious
duty not to use the same well. The two-sided right would appear to
many people, including many untouchables and government offi-
cers, to be in keeping with religious faith, which made the famine
authorities take extra caution when overriding it. Ambedkar’s dec-
laration that “[t]he Untouchable does not want water. What he
wants is the right to draw water from a common well” implicates a
moral imperative.22
By and large, the historiography of access to natural resources
in India tends to be preoccupied with legal property rights rather
than cultural norms. A popular reading of Indian famines claims
that “in most of India water had always been a communally man-
aged common resource.” According to such readings, sharing and
cooperation were the ancient norms, and inequality and exclusion
were the colonial inventions—a questionable claim. Colonial
21 BhimraoR. Ambedkar,Annihilation of Caste (Bombay, 1936); Pandurang V. Kane,History of
the Dharmashastra (Pune, 1930–1962), II, Part 1, 23; Kautilya’sArthashastra (trans. R. Shamahastri),
https://csboa.com/eBooks/Arthashastra_of_Chanakya_-_English.pdf ): “A reservoir of water
belonging to Chándálas is serviceable only to Chándálas, but not to others” (35). See also Deepa
Joshi and Ben Fawcett, “Water, HinduMythology and anUnequal Social Order in India,” paper
presented at the second conference of the InternationalWaterHistory Association, Bergen, 2011.
22 Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago, 1970),
43; Leif Wener, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXXIII (2005), 223–252,
repr. in Brian H. Bix and Horacio Spector (eds.), Rights: Concepts and Contexts (Aldershot, 2012),
213–242; Ambedkar, “Gandhi and His Fast” (1932),Writings and Speeches (New Delhi, 1989), V,
329–395 (emphasis added).
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reforms recognized property rights but left the right to the commons
undefined. Precisely because the state did not frame these rights in
detail, the right to the commons remained embedded in cultural
practice. Did culture advocate inclusion, as the citation says, or ex-
clusion, as the classical scholars would say? Shah rejects the notion of
inclusion: “Indian peasant society was highly unequal even before
the British came in. One source of this stratification is the caste
system, which also blocked the entry of large sections of Indian rural
society into landownership.” What is true of land should be true of
water as well; both of them were scarce resources.23
Whether ancient or not, the moral command was under attack
during the protest movements that emerged in the interwar period.
Two court judgments bookend the most significant phase of that
movement. In 1914, theTimes of India reported a court case in which
Hiraman Dhondi Mochi, a leather worker and an untouchable,
concealed his caste identity to drawwater from a sacred lake affiliated
with a temple near Bombay, whereupon the temple sued him for
defiling the water. Insult to religion being an offense under penal
law, the magistrate ordered a prison sentence. On appeal, the case
was settled in Mochi’s favor. The appellate court made a distinction
between drawing water and intentional disrespect to religion, ob-
serving that if the two acts conflated, all rivers would be inaccessible
to most Indians.24
Whether an effect of the judgment or the expansion of local
governance, the next ten years witnessed groups in many villages
of western India trying to take control of pools that the upper castes
held sacred. These cases ordinarily ended not with violence or with a
protracted legal battle but with some form of arbitration. In a 1924
incident at the central-Maharashtra town of Lonar, a “band of 500
untouchables” failed to ““pollute” the sacred stream” because the
“Deputy Commissioner . . . threatened the depressed classes with
instantaneous arrests in case they repeated their attempts.” A 1931
23 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World
(New York, 2001), 331; Mihir Shah, “The Rule of Water: Statecraft, Ecology and Collective
Action in South India by David Mosse,” Conservation and Society, II (2004), 201–204; idem.,
“Structures of Power in Indian Society: A Response,” Economic and Political Weekly, 43 (2008),
78–83. For a critique of the myth of an “eco-golden-age” of water access in rural India, see
Shri Krishan, “Water Harvesting Traditions and the Social Milieu in India: A Second Look,”
Economic and Political Weekly, 46 (2011), 87–95.
24 Anon., “Appellate Side: Defilement of Well Water,” Times of India, 28 July 1914.
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movement to open access to a well failed because of a dispute among
the depressed caste groups. Caste set a moving target. “Within the
ranks of ‘untouchables’ are grades of untouchability, and where this
is the case the higher grades will not drink from thewells of the lower
grades.”25
Another type of outcome was a result of outside arbitration,
which became more frequent in western India after Mohandas K.
Gandhi and Ambedkar both tried to usher the depressed castes into
the political mainstream, with different arguments. In 1931, a political
activist persuaded the upper castes in a Karnatak village to open access
to the deprived castes, whom he convinced to refrain from eating
meat and drinking alcohol. Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste docu-
mented many more cases of local protest. Newspapers in the cities
had also documented and discussed numerous instances wherein pri-
vately secure water became a target. The most organized movement
was in the small town ofMahad, 100miles south of Bombay, where a
group led by Ambedkar in 1927 tried to gain the right to draw water
from a tank. Despite its lack of success in court that year, it helped
Ambedkar eventually to become the most influential campaigner
for caste equality in Indian politics. In 1931, a judge in the local court
decreed that the Mahad tank was a public property open to all. The
judgment gave prestige to the movement and further elevated
Ambedkar’s status.26
Western India was the center of this political activity. In South
India, the non-Brahmin movement in provincial politics adopted
the cause, with less publicity. In North India, caste difference entailed
new rules for sharing, but water was not a scarce resource there. Con-
flicts emerged when religious reformers challenged these rules.
Provincial and princely state legislatures followed the incidents
and court judgments closely. The princely state of Baroda passed a
law that would deprive any organization practicing discrimination
of government grants based on caste. After the Bombay Legislative
Council passed a resolution in 1923 that government grants would
25 Anon., “Caste Warfare,” Times of India, 16 Aug. 1924; Anon., “Water, Water!” ibid., 25
April 1925.
26 Anon., “Untouchables Use Water from Common Pond,” Times of India, 21 Nov. 1931.
For descriptions of the Mahad incident and its legacy, see Gail Omvedt, Dalit Visions: The
Anti-caste Movement and the Construction of an Indian Identity (Hyderabad, 2006), 44; Anupama
Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India (Berkeley, 2009). Anon., “Un-
touchables Win: Mahad Tank Declared Public Property,” Times of India, 22 Jan. 1931.
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not be available for wells or land containing a pool unless all castes had
equal access, groups of people forced their entry into tanks situated on
government land.27
Between the judgments of 1914 and 1931, case law established
the important principle that a source belonging to a public body (a
temple or otherwise) was a public good. Together these incidents
made the struggle for equality a political issue. When an elected
legislature assumed control of the provincial governments during
the interwar period, the issue of water equality came to the fore.
According to Rao, with reference to Mahad, “The events of 1927
marked a significant departure in Dalit politics and inaugurated
urban-centered regional associational forms.” Rao deemed this
departure the transformation of untouchables into Dalits, or genuine
political subjects. The year after the Mahad judgment, Gandhi’s All
India Anti-Untouchability League formed. The figure of Ambedkar
loomed large in any discussion of equality, not least because of the
caste reservation of electoral seats that he had helped to achieve,
despite Gandhi’s opposition.28
What exactly did the movement achieve with regard to the
access to, and safety of, water? In 1932, participants in a seminar
on equality held in Bombay observed that “there had been a remark-
able change in the spirit of the people . . . in the cities”; but “fear
and . . . oppression” still prevailed in more rural areas. In the cities,
where water was more readily available, piped water had effectively
ended the predominance of private rights, whereas in the country-
side, where water was scarce, the progress of public works was not
enough to end the dominance of private rights.29
After independence in 1947, the democratic state turned its atten-
tion to the battle in the villages. In the peninsular states and in Gujarat,
27 For examples of the non-Brahmin movement in South India, see Adapa Satyanarayana,
“Nation, Caste, and the Past: Articulation of Dalitbahujan Identity, Consciousness and Ide-
ology,” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, LXV (2004), 416–467; for a north Indian
conflict involving the Arya Samaj, Kenneth W. Jones, “Ham Hindu Nahin: Arya-Sikh Re-
lations, 1877–1905,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII (1973), 457–475.
28 Rao, Caste Question.
29 Anon., “The Depressed Classes: Progress in Western India,” Times of India, 24 Nov.
1932. As Mansukh G. Bhagat, “The Untouchable Classes of Maharashtra,” Journal of the Uni-
versity of Bombay, IV (1935), 130–174, noted a few years after Mahad, “Nowhere have I found
a common well used by the touchables [Sic.] and the untouchables, although from time to
time, the Government might have issued orders, that all the public wells should be thrown
open to all” (163).
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where periodic aridity and caste-based inequality were common, the
state governments devoted part of their budget to the construction of
wells for depressed caste people. Political and administrative conflicts
beset these actions; the creation of separate wells for the lower castes
seemed to perpetuate discrimination. The proliferation of agencies to
achieve multiple goals—security, equality, and sanitation—made prog-
ress slow andmaintenance chaotic.Not surprisingly, reports of inequal-
ity and discrimination persisted in surveys of access. Nevertheless, the
movement had killed the force of the moral rule regarding purity. At
the end of the twentieth century, the field of ritual purity had nar-
rowed, applyingmore to temple access than to water. “Untouchability
is not experienced in normal times[; only] when water is scarce, [do]
the [oppressed castes] experience difficulty and discrimination in taking
water.”30
The state was only indirectly an agent of change in the struggle
for equality, but it played a direct role in carrying out public works
with taxpayers’money.Waterwas probably themost important field
of public investment and expenditure in colonial India. The scale of
the investment, however, was highly uneven and geographically
conditioned.
PUBLIC WORKS: DAMS, CANALS, AND MULTIPURPOSE PROJECTS In the
nineteenth century, officers and engineers believed that a state-led
technological responsewould solve the problem, impounding excess
flow in rivers via dams and reservoirs. This strategy seemed obvious
in a monsoon climate with a vast “wastage” of rainwater available to
meet the needs of eager farmers. In the southern deltas during the
1840s, new canals encouraged rice cultivation, trade, and business
at local ports. In today’s western Uttar Pradesh (UP) and the Haryana
states, the construction of a network of canals (later called Ganges
and Jumna) in the nineteenth century partly entailed the revival of
dormant channels created by the Indo-Islamic states that had ruled
30 Ishwarlal P. Desai, Water Facilities for the Untouchables in Rural Gujarat: A Report (New
Delhi, 1973); Sukhadeo Thorat, “Oppression and Denial: Dalit Discrimination in the
1990s,” Economic and Political Weekly, XXXVII (2002), 572–578. For the persistence of water
discrimination, see Hannah Johns, “Stigmatization of Dalits in Access to Water and Sanitation
in India,” submitted to the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (New Delhi, c. 2012);
Sanjiv J. Phansalkar, “Water, Equity and Development,” International Journal of Rural Management,
III (2007), 1–25. A. M. Shah, “Purity, Impurity, Untouchability: Then and Now,” Sociological
Bulletin, LVI (2007), 355–368.
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the region from the fourteenth century. By contrast to South India
or the Ganges–Jumna area, Punjab and Sind pursued the creation of
canals from perennial rivers on a much larger scale. Between 1870
and 1920, engineers tapped the five rivers of Punjab, turning a vast
extent of interfluvial tracts into arable land.31
During the interwar period, the impounding model changed.
The new canal systems followed the American model of the “multi-
purpose” project to create a reservoir, a hydro-electric power gener-
ation plant, and irrigation canals. For at least forty years after India’s
independence, this paradigm of hydraulic engineering prevailed. The
immediate impetus to expand the Punjabi canal system came from an
emergency caused by the Partition of India—the need to resettle
peasant migrants in both India and Pakistan. Moreover, by 1940,
the Punjabi canals had become incapable of meeting the demands
of the four-million hectares of irrigated land that they served. After
the Partition, India and Pakistan, which shared the canal system,
had limited options for its expansion. India built the Bhakhra Dam
Project, first proposed in 1919, to impound the Sutlej River. Pakistan
was keen to build reservoirs in the upper valleys, which included
Kashmir. After the initial boost in India, massive investment on the
upland rivers in southern and eastern India ensued. By 1990, Indian
rivers had more than 2,000 dams, most of them appearing on the
Deccan rivers after 1947.32
A similar trajectory unfolded in the cities, where the impounding
idea had immense support. Geographically, the port cities suffered
from neither a water shortage nor the exigencies of seasonality. In
the past, the seaboard, which was far more dependent on services
and manufacturing than on agriculture, usually received more average
rainfall, thanks to the vagaries of the monsoonwind. Precisely because
life was more secure there, cities like Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras
31 The river-water recycling models differed between Punjab, Sindh, the southern deltas,
and the Ganges-Jumna tract. For a recent work on a major project in the Punjab state, see
Zahid Ali Khalid, “State, Society and Environment in the Ex-State of Bahawalpur: A Case
Study of the Sutlej Valley Project, 1921–1947,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Univ. of Sussex, 2017);
for Sindh, David Gilmartin, Blood and Water: The Indus River Basin in Modern History (Berkeley,
2015).
32 For the emergence of the American model and a case study, see Aditya Ramesh, “Water
Technocracy: Dams, Experts, and Development in South India,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (School
of Oriental and African Studies, Univ. of London, 2018). R. MacLagan Gorrie, “Soil and
Water Conservation in the Punjab,” Geographical Review, XXVIII (1938), 20–31.
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received many migrants. Their high population growth created local
shortages as well as sanitation crises from time to time.
Until well into the nineteenth century, most cities were not too
dissimilar from the countryside. Supplies came from ponds, lakes,
and wells. According to a report about Pune (Poona) of 1872,
“The poor low caste people have . . . to wait at a little distance from
the wells until some person of caste gives them, either for money or
out of charity, a small quantity of water. There are very few wells
in the city which are accessible to any but persons of caste.” The
mention of payment by “money” suggests that markets emerged
in the cities during shortages, and even though all markets tended
to exclude the poor, markets could overcome caste distinctions.
During the hot season in Bombay city, “we see water carts going
about the town distributing scanty supplies here and there.” Condi-
tionswere not different inMadras province, as economists’ surveys of
immigrant localities in the interwar period discovered.33
The engineering corps of the army and the urban administration
had advocates of gravity schemes, as well as skeptics who doubted
how receptive Indian city dwellers would be to the idea of piped
water served via a faucet that they would have to pay a tax to access.
This resistance notwithstanding, towns developed gravity systems
and pipes, with the help of the growing economic and political
power of businesspersons, as well as a general moral concern about
“filth,” an issue that had originated in Britain and migrated to dif-
ferent parts of the Empire.34
Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras Bombay was a case in point.
Despite its heavy rainfall, the scale of its migration placed a huge draft
onwater. From1872 to 1881, the famine decade, Bombay’s population
increased by 20 percent, whereas the population of the Bombay Pres-
idency (or Province) stayed unchanged. The city’s population teemed
with migrants fleeing the dry regions. In the next decade, Bombay’s
population fell 6 percent because of plague and cholera epidemics.
The medical experts attributed the outbreaks to overcrowding, poor
33 Anon., “Great Scarcity of Water at Poona,” Times of India, 4 June 1872; Thomas Blaney,
letter, “Our Inefficient Water-Supply,” ibid., 5 May 1884; D. Arulanandam Pillai, “Problems
Relating to Paraiyas in the Tanjore District,” Papers Read at the Third Annual Conference of the
Indian Economic Association Held in the Senate House, Madras, 1919–1920 (Madras, 1920), 88.
34 John Broich, “Engineering the Empire: British Water Supply Systems and Colonial
Societies, 1850–1900,” Journal of British Studies, XLVI (2007), 346–365.
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sanitation, and poor water quality, though their relief plans often
made matters worse. The scientific response to the problem, which
had already seen some success, was to tap or dam the numerous
seasonal streams in the watershed. Sanitary reformers campaigned for
technology that would pipe water from the lakes into the city’s storage
tanks, and the administration set up the infrastructure. A key element in
the initiative was to involve the city’s wealthy Indian merchants in
public activities. The city now had an executive authority of its own,
and water was its first field of action. Notwithstanding the corruption
scandals around municipal finances and strong resistance to paying the
tax, the supply conditions changed.35
Calcutta’s mid-nineteenth-century history with water was sim-
ilar, though the source of its piped water was different. In 1870, a
central system processed water from the Hooghly River—storing
it in settling tanks, filtering and restoring it in covered wells, and sup-
plying it to homes via pipes. Systems like Calcutta’s appeared in
northern towns in the late nineteenth century wherever rivers were
available. Bombay’s “impounding reservoir” system had a counter-
part in the Deccan cities, especially Hyderabad, where artificial lakes
trapped rainwater for use in the drier seasons. Pune relied on a com-
bination of tanks and rivers. Much of the public supply came from
reservoirs in the Katraj Valley and the Kharakwasla Lake (which was
built by damming the Mutha River) via aqueducts.
The economics of building and sustaining these systems varied.
The cost was relatively high in southern India. Take Madras, for
example. The weaker monsoon and higher average annual tempera-
ture there than in Bombay and Calcutta rendered surface and under-
ground water subject to sharper fluctuations. Madras harnessed the
Adyar and Coovam Rivers, but the channels received enough water
only during the monsoon. Moreover, such waterworks were an ex-
pensive proposition for a city with relatively low business income.
Yet, the very existence of a public authority funded by the tax-
payers’ money managed to turn water into a quasi-public good.
Piped water initiated a revolution because it weakened water as a
marker of poverty. This is not to imply that poverty and inequality
disappeared. As migration outstripped the capacity of the system,
35 Mariam Dossal, “Henry Conybeare and the Politics of Centralised Water Supply in Mid-
nineteenth Century Bombay,” Indian Economic and Social History Review, XXV (1988), 79–96;
Sapana Doshi, “Imperial Water, Urban Crisis: A Political Ecology of Colonial State Forma-
tion in Bombay, 1850–1890,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center), XXXVII (2014), 173–218.
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poorer migrants could access a smaller quantity of pipedwater. In the
colonial era, pipes reached European homes first. Nonetheless, piped
water gave the cities some security from water famine. Recent sur-
veys of standards of living find that most families living in the cities
have access to “some form of communal running water supply.”
Suchmeasures of urban living standards, combined with the propor-
tion of the urban oppressed caste population, provide an indication
of the extent to which inequality in access to water has changed since
the early twentieth century. In 1901, this joint proportion was con-
siderably lower than in 2001.36
India’s urbanization rate was relatively low in the four decades
after independence, before it began to accelerate sharply. By the
end of the twentieth century, growing population and water usage
in the cities had seriously stressed the capacity of the public system.
India’s economic boom was an urban phenomenon. Certain cities,
like Bangalore or Madras, emerged as hubs of global service export
and magnets to a skilled and educated workforce. As the density of
population in the inner areas increased, and apartment blocks ate up
space, the old-style homestead wells disappeared. But municipal
supply continually fell behind demand. In apartments as well as home-
steads, bore wells (or artesian wells) increasingly produced the supply.
Municipal piped water mainly served the poorer residents of the city.
Although the bore well was well known as a tool from the early
twentieth century, no one could have foreseen the enormous
demand that agricultural and urban consumption would make on
groundwater in the new millennium. This subject, which is central
to the stress issue, needs historical contextualization.37
WATER STRESS Water stress—a growing imbalance between use
and stock, causing shortages as well as conflicts—stemmed from the
36 Nicolas Martin, “Rural Elites and the Limits of Scheduled Caste Assertiveness in Rural Malwa,
Punjab,” Economic and Political Weekly, L (2015), 37–44. In 1901, 11% of the Indian population
was urban. In 2001, 28% was urban, 20% of the “scheduled caste” population was urban. India,
Handbook of Social Welfare Statistics (New Delhi, 2016). The corresponding percentage for water
access in 1901 is unavailable. Assuming that the proportion rose at the same rate as the average
urban percentage, the 1901 figure for the oppressed castes would be 8%. However, given the
historically well-established weaker access of the oppressed castes to education and capital—
measures of which ordinarily rose with the percentage of the urban population—the percentage
of access to water in 1901 for the oppressed classes would have been even smaller.
37 Anthony Acciavatti, “Re-imagining the Indian Underground: A Biography of the Tubewell,”
in Anne Rademacher and Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan (eds.), Places of Nature in Ecologies
of Urbanism (Hong Kong, 2017), 206–237.
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unsustainability of the impounding paradigm in the late twentieth
century. Concern about rising stress started in the second decade of the
twentieth centurywhen the studyof economics and agronomy emerged.
Some contributors to this field believed that the river projects were
changing local geographies for the worse. Colonial preoccupation with
rivers sometimes led to a neglect of traditional resource-management
systems like tanks. The criticisms, however, did not seriously chal-
lenge the prevailing model of irrigation; post-independence India
inherited and based projects on that principle. A resolve to end
poverty hadmade the developmental agenda overlook potential costs
of irrigation projects; “overriding priority was mostly placed on the
first-order effects of technology and economic growth.” The 1970s
Green Revolution further endorsed the investment in canals.38
From the 1970s onward, the costs were becoming too great to
ignore. To many critics, the dams caused floods because of reservoirs
that were overfull during monsoons, forcing engineers to release ex-
cess water on short notice. These floods degraded land by interfering
with natural silt flows; disrupted aquatic life; destroyed forests; caused
waterlogging, salination, and diseases; displaced people; and in-
creased the risk of earthquakes. The protests reached their peak with
the Narmada River project, which had been conceived in the 1950s
and begun during the 1980s. When the project’s extensive displace-
ment and environmental consequences became apparent in the
1990s, a few Indian NGOs campaigned against it. Although it did
not halt, it was possibly the last multipurpose river-basin project to
materialize in India.39
Canal irrigation also came under attack, for encouraging waste at
the head end and shortage at the tail end. Farmers adapted coping
patterns to seasonal scarcity and devised their own rules to contain open
conflicts on a local basis. The heavy losses of water in the conveyance
from the source to points of use contributed to India’s low levels ofwater
productivity. Evaporation contributed to these losses, but management
38 Velayutham Saravanan, Water and the Environmental History of Modern India (London,
2020); Margaret R. Biswas and Asit K. Biswas, “Complementarity between Environment
and Development Processes,” Environmental Conservation, XI (1984), 35–44.
39 Satyajit K. Singh, “Evaluating Large Dams in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 25
(1990), 561–574. For a short historical account of the river projects and their controversies,
see Michael H. Fisher, An Environmental History of India: From Earliest Times to the Twenty-First
Century (New York, 2018). Robert H. Wade, “Muddy Waters: Inside the World Bank as It
Struggled with the Narmada Projects,” Economic and Political Weekly, 46 (2011), 44–65.
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and engineering failure compounded the problem. Poorly lined canals
caused considerable water to percolate underground.40
Water-Sharing Conflict A more important dispute involved the
sharing of river flows between states within India and nation-states of
South Asia. Three large economies in South Asia share water from
the Indo-Gangetic Basin; two of them, India and Pakistan, rely on
the five rivers of the Indus Basin for irrigation and power. All of these
rivers originate inside India, and four of them flow inside Pakistan. The
Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which allowed Pakistan to exploit the
western riversmore intensivelywhile granting India rights to the eastern
rivers, survived relatively trouble-free until 2002, when the countries
exchanged threats. Indeed, hydro-political analysis has grown more
alarmist, acknowledging that the prospect of war about water is not be-
yond imagination, especially because the terms of negotiation in inter-
national treaties reflect the economic weight of nations more than
ecological considerations. Furthermore, climate change has shifted the
geographical knowledge base onwhich someof the dealswere drawn.41
In the Deccan region, where five states of India share three river
basins of limited capacity and fluctuating levels of supply, interstate
disputes about riparian flow typically involve two or more territorial
units positioned on different reaches of a river. In 1956, an Interstate
River Water Disputes Act created a framework for negotiations,
inquiries, tribunals, and processes for appeal. TheAct assumed control
of the task that state-appointed tribunals had earlier performed, as in
40 Ashok K. Mitra, “Underutilisation Revisited: Surface Irrigation in Drought Prone Areas
of Western Maharashtra,” Economic and Political Weekly, 21 (1986), 752–756. For the problem
of waste and shortage in the Krishna basin, the largest field of irrigation development in the
Deccan Plateau, see Bret Wallach, “Irrigation Developments in the Krishna Basin since 1947,”
Geographical Review, LXXIV (1984), 127–144. Peter Mollinga, On the Waterfront: Water Distri-
bution, Technology and Agrarian Change in a South Indian Canal Irrigation System (Hyderabad,
2003): “[T]he rules are resources that are called upon when needed” (181); Mitra, “Joint
Management of Irrigation Systems in India: Relevance of Japanese Experience,” Economic
and Political Weekly, 27 (1992), A75–A82. For several examples of disputes about river water,
see Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, Ecology and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in
Contemporary India (New York, 1995), 76–81; Saravanan, Water.
41 Brahma Chellaney,Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, D.C., 2011); Paula Hanasz,
“Power Flows: Hydro-hegemony and Water Conflicts in South Asia,” Security Challenges, X
(2014), 95–112; Daanish Mustafa, “Social Construction of Hydropolitics: The Geographical
Scales of Water and Security in the Indus Basin,” Geographical Review, XCVII (2007), 484–501.
For the origin of the Treaty and its durability notwithstanding regional politics, see David Haines,
Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan (New York, 2017). India’s
decision to build a barrage on the Ganges at the Bangladesh border (1973/4) caused much un-
easiness between the two countries. The river-sharing arrangements between India and Nepal, and
between India and Bhutan, were more peaceful.





it.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/4/565/1890072/jinh_a_01628.pdf by guest on 17 M
arch 2021
the Kaveri River dispute. The history of agreements to share the
Kaveri River dates back to the early twentieth-century treaties
between the Mysore state and the Madras Presidency. A larger share
of the water went to deltaic Tamil Nadu, where the waters sustained
intensive cultivation in the Thanjavur rice belt, but a larger area of the
basin fell in the Karnataka state. The agreements set limits on intra-
territory usage, dam building, and reservoir capacity in the upper
reaches of the river. From the 1970s onward, the Green Revolution,
industrialization, and urban use increased the demand for water
throughout the basin, making the tribunals’ task of adjucating almost
impossible to achieve. In 1995 and 2002, a weak monsoon reduced
flow in the river and the reservoirs, compelling Karnataka to capture
morewater. The resultwas ongoing civil unrest inTamilNadu.Those
engaged in the arbitration process appeared to believe that institutional
solutions to such conflicts were possible. Yet, some of the longest-
running disputes involved a sharp rise in usage that effectively defeated
the judicial process. The tribunal discussed the capacity of the rivers,
whereas agents who were not part of the process shaped demand.
Cities, Farms, Waste, and Depletion The surface-water model
came under pressure from the cities during the 2000s: “A combina-
tion of institutional path dependence and a neoliberal restructuring”
has “extended the ability of [the cities] to establish new forms of water
entitlement in rural and peri-urban areas.” Allocation to the cities
routinely entailed stormy negotiations between the city and the
farmers around it, which began in the ministries in charge of drinking
water and irrigation but eventually wound up in politics. The river
model had already died by that time. Wells were politically safer.
India’s rice-based Green Revolution of the 1980s, which cen-
tered mainly on groundwater, met with success in food production
but at an enormous environmental cost. Soil nutrients depleted in
many cases, and water was mined recklessly. As farmers increasingly
began to suffer, some states offered them cheap electricity, leading
to huge rise in groundwater extraction. Outside agriculture, ground-
water and capitalism became deeply interdependent. Wells provided
80 percent of urban and industrial water.42
42 Bharat Punjabi and Craig A. Johnson, “The Politics of Rural–Urban Water Conflict in
India: Untapping the Power of Institutional Reform,”World Development, CXX (2019), 182–192.
For case studies about urban and peri-urban water systems in recent decades, see Vishal Narain
and Anjal Prakash (eds.), Water Security in Peri-urban South Asia: Adapting to Climate Change and
Urbanization (Delhi, 2016); for the shift toward privatization of water in the cities, Vandana
Asthana, Water Policy Processes in India: Discourses of Power and Resistance (New York, 2009).
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As private investment in wells assumed the responsibility of
supplying farms, factories, and citieswithwater, depletion due to over-
use of the aquifers became a new worry. Between 1995 and 2004, the
proportion of the Indian population living in “unsafe” districts—those
in which the aquifers no longer were able to recharge and sustain
current levels of extraction—increased from 7 to 35 percent. In the
northern districts that had led the earlier wheat-based Green
Revolution, exploitation of groundwater in the 1990s far exceeded
the capacity of the aquifers to respond. Pakistan faced the same problem
on a larger scale. Elsewhere, the hydrogeological conditions
influencing supply varied too much to make predictions on future
supply a simple matter. Themain issue, however, was not thematter
of volume per se but the fact that the law implicitly viewed ground-
water as a private good even though it came from a shared pool.43
Experts on depletion came in several categories. Economists usu-
ally explored market-based solutions to the problem. Geographers and
political scientists observed that non-market processes, often called
capture and appropriation, prevailed in many cases. Few such cases in-
volved extralegal or coercive means. More often, political arm-twisting
addressed them. In addition, experts in demandmanagement fromNGOs
strongly advocated the use of water-saving technologies like drips and
sprinklers. Everymethod to deal with shortage required certain precon-
ditions, none of which works perfectly to contain demand in cities or
restrain private investment. Indeed, as the marginal cost of extraction
rose (as discussed above), no state could hope to subsidize it alone; pri-
vate investment had to expand. In other words, there had to be a trade-
off between economic sustainability and ecological sustainability.44
Environmental Law and the Public Trust Before independence,
the law left the private right to groundwater intact while weakening
exclusionary rules on the commons. The Indian Easements Act of
1882 recognized customary rights to water, but custom was often
disputed, iniquitous, or damaging. Beginning in the interwar period,
courts and a few provincial legislatures sanctioned an eminent-
domain rule, whereby the state could take control of a common source
43 P. S. Vijay Shankar, Himanshu Kulkarni, and Sunderrajan Krishnan, “India’s Ground-
water Challenge and the Way Forward,” Economic and Political Weekly, 46 (2011), 37–45.
44 Mattia Celio, Christopher A. Scott, and Mark Giordano, “Urban-agricultural Water
Appropriation: The Hyderabad, India Case,” Geographical Journal, CLXXVI (2010), 39–57;
A. Narayanamoorthy, “Drip and Sprinkler Irrigation in India: Benefits, Potential and Future
Directions,” Agris (2012), 254–266.
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“in the public interest.” More recently, activists have campaigned to
strengthen the public trust as well as to end exclusive private rights in
groundwater. Legally, a well is private property now; under a reformed
legal system, a well would have the status of common property. Poli-
tics, however, has defended private investment and private property
more fiercely since India’s economic boom began.45
The public trust in environmental law can be applied in differ-
ent ways. One of them is non-excludability. Because all water comes
from common pools, “one does not own a property right in water in
the same way he owns his watch or his shoes, but that he owns only
usufruct—an interest that incorporates the needs of others.” In India,
the public trust argument has started to appear more often, though
few significant cases have dealt withwater. In 1997, a SupremeCourt
case affirmed that the state was the trustee for the water in the com-
mons. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in
India, passed in 1974 and long-dormant, became a rallying point
for several hundred cases since 2000. In recent years, the court has
heard cases that invoked this law and the constitutional right to personal
liberty to demand “safe and clean” drinking water—the meaning of
which varies between one department of government and another,
as well as between the courtroom and the scientific community—free
from the actions of polluting industries. A recent judgment involving
the Ganges affirmed that rivers have the same right as a legal person,
giving rise to administrative confusion over who is the trustee of that
right since most rivers flow over several states.46
This article argues that actions that improved water security enabled
economic and population growth in India, at the cost of ecological
stress. A series of actions taken by the state, scientists, and society since
1880weakened the chains that linkedwater insecurity, low yield,mass
mortality, and caste-biased mortality. The story has two lessons for
comparative development.
45 Videh Upadhyay, “The Ownership of Water in Indian Laws,” in Ramaswamy R. Iyer
(ed.), Water and the Laws in India (New Delhi, 2009), 134–148.
46 Joseph L. Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention,” Michigan Law Review, LXVIII (1970), 485; Jona Razzaque, “Application of
Public Trust Doctrine in Indian Environmental Cases,” Journal of Environmental Law, XIII
(2001), 221-234; Philippe Cullet, Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms
in India (New York, 2009); Aviram Sharma, “Drinking Water Quality in Indian Water
Policies, Laws, and Courtrooms: Understanding the Intersections of Science and Law in
Developing Countries,” Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, XXXVII (2017), 45–56.
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The first concerns economic history, which tries to discover the
preconditions of modern economic growth. Theories of growth
have a standard structure. They explain the genesis of income growth
with a variable that pertained to Western Europe, release from the
burden of predatory states or overpopulation. Having established
Europe’s success story, the theories note the absence of this variable
from the economically less-developedworld. The contention herein
is that the approach is flawed because Europe and this other world
are geographically incommensurate. Because their initial conditions
were different, they could arrive at economic growth only by solving
different problems.
A climatically conditioned water supply was the obstacle to
modern economic growth in India; human intervention helped to
alleviate it. The thesis has broader implications. Much of the world
is dry. Western Europe, Japan, and North America are fortunate
exceptions. For the rest of the world, a society’s ability to control
water determined its ability to generate population and economic
growth. European history can tell us little about how non-Western
societies acquired that ability.
The second lesson concerns sustainability. In India, environ-
mental stress was the price paid for welfare gains. Popular discourse,
however, does not usually see it in that way. It remains trapped in a
rhetoric lamenting the tragedy of the commons, in which stress
occurs wherever private greed and weak property rights jointly lead
to overuse of shared resources. The maxim that emerged from
Hardin’s framing is that “freedom in the commons brings ruins to
all.”On the contrary, freedom in the commonswas a benefit tending
toward growth and welfare, not tragedy. Vulnerable geography
made the process costly to sustain. In a dry region, well-being and
the environment are constantly in flux. Asking deprived individuals
to consume less or cooperatemore is not necessarily the best response
to such a fluid situation. Science and capitalism—the mechanisms
that work behind drip irrigation, to take one example—may well
be a better solution.47
47 For Hardin’s maxim, see “Extensions of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons,’” Science,
CCLXXX (1998), 682–683.
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